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Abstract
In the theory of judgment aggregation, it is known for which agen-
das of propositions it is possible to aggregate individual judgments into
collective ones in accordance with the Arrow-inspired requirements of
universal domain, collective rationality, unanimity preservation, non-
dictatorship and propositionwise independence. But it is only partially
known for which agendas it is possible to respect additional require-
ments, notably non-oligarchy, anonymity, no individual veto power, or
implication preservation. We fully characterize the agendas for which
there are such possibilities, thereby answering the most salient open
questions about propositionwise judgment aggregation. Our results
build on earlier results by Nehring and Puppe (2002), Nehring (2006)
and Dietrich and List (2007a).
1 Introduction
Many democratically organized groups, such as electorates, legislatures, com-
mittees, juries and expert panels, are faced with the problem of judgment
aggregation: They have to make collective judgments on certain propositions
on the basis of the group members’ individual judgments on them, for exam-
ple on whether to pursue a particular policy proposal, to hold a defendant
guilty, or to nd that global warming poses a threat of a certain magnitude.
Although both authors are jointly responsible for this paper, Christian List wishes to
note that Franz Dietrich should be considered the primary author, who deserves the credit
for the present mathematical proofs. Addresses: F. Dietrich, Department of Quantitative
Economics, Maastricht University, and CPNSS, London School of Economics; C. List, De-
partments of Government and Philosophy, London School of Economics.
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In such cases, it is natural to expect that the group’s judgment on any propo-
sition should be determined by the individual members’ judgments on it. Call
this the idea of propositionwise aggregation, or technically, independence. This
idea is naturally reected in the way in which we normally make decisions in
committee meetings, conduct referenda or take votes on issues we want to ad-
judicate collectively. Propositionwise aggregation can further be shown to be a
necessary condition for the non-manipulability of the decision process, both by
strategic voting (Dietrich and List 2007b, see also Nehring and Puppe 2002)
and by strategic agenda setting (Dietrich 2006a, List 2004). Yet the recent
literature on judgment aggregation shows that propositionwise aggregation is
surprisingly hard to reconcile with the rationality of the resulting group judg-
ments. An entire sequence of by-now much-discussed results (beginning with
List and Pettit 2002, 2004) shows that, for many decision problems, only dic-
tatorial or otherwise unattractive aggregation rules full the requirement of
propositionwise aggregation while also ensuring rational group judgments (for
a review, see below and List and Puppe 2009). The classic illustration of what
can go wrong is given by the discursive dilemma (Pettit 2001, building on
Kornhauser and Sager 1986). If individual judgments are as shown in Table
1, for example, majority voting, the paradigmatic example of a proposition-
wise aggregation rule, generates logically inconsistent group judgments. The
results in the literature on judgment aggregation have generalized this nding
well beyond majority voting.
   
Individual 1 True True True
Individual 2 True False False
Individual 3 False True False
Majority True True False
Table 1: A discursive dilemma
While this clearly highlights the need to nd plausible aggregation rules
that lift the restriction of propositionwise aggregation (and the literature al-
ready contains some work on this, as discussed at the end of this paper), there
are still — surprisingly — a number of open questions on the classic, proposition-
wise case. The aim of this paper is to answer the most salient such questions.
In particular, we prove new results on the existence of propositionwise ag-
gregation rules which are non-oligarchic, anonymous, give no individual veto
power, or are implication-preserving, as properly dened below. To give a more
careful overview of our results, it is helpful to review the most closely related
existing results. We begin by introducing the classic background conditions
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imposed on propositionwise aggregation (formal denitions are given later).
Call an aggregation rule regular if it accepts as admissible input all combina-
tions of fully rational individual judgments (universal domain) and produces
as its output fully rational collective judgments (collective rationality). Call it
unanimity-preserving if, in the event that all individuals hold the same judg-
ments on all propositions, these judgments become the collective ones. The
case of regular, unanimity-preserving and propositionwise judgment aggrega-
tion is interesting since it naturally generalizes Arrow’s famous conditions on
preference aggregation to the context of judgment aggregation (List and Pettit
2004, Dietrich and List 2007a, Dokow and Holzman forthcoming).
A much-cited result shows that, when (and only when) the decision prob-
lem (called agenda) under consideration has two combinatorial properties, the
only judgment aggregation rules satisfying these conditions are the dictator-
ships (Dokow and Holzman forthcoming; the ‘when’ part was independently
obtained by Dietrich and List 2007a), which can be shown to generalize Arrow’s
classic theorem. This result, in turn, builds on an earlier result on abstract ag-
gregation by Nehring and Puppe (2002),1 which requires the aggregation rule to
satisfy the further condition of monotonicity (according to which the collective
acceptance of a proposition is never reversed by increased individual support)
but applies to a larger class of decision problems with only one of the two com-
binatorial properties. Another pair of results addresses the case in which the
aggregation rule is required to satisfy an additional neutrality condition (re-
quiring equal treatment of all propositions — the conjunction of propositionwise
independence and neutrality is called systematicity). Here Dietrich and List
(2007a) characterize the class of decision problems for which only dictatorial
aggregation rules are possible, while Nehring and Puppe’s earlier paper (2002)
provides the analogous characterization in the case in which monotonicity is
required as well. Nehring and Puppe (in Nehring and Puppe 2005, Nehring
2006) also characterize the classes of decision problems for which all regular,
unanimity-preserving, propositionwise and monotonic aggregation rules are (i)
oligarchic, (ii) give some individual veto power, (iii) violate anonymity, or (iv)
violate a requirement of neutrality between propositions and their negations.
With the exception of case (iv), however, the analogous results without requir-
ing monotonicity are not yet known (in case (iv), see Dietrich and List 2005).
The case without the monotonicity requirement, where aggregation rules can
1Nehring and Puppe’s results were originally formulated in the theory of strategy-proof
social choice but are translatable into the frameworks of abstract aggregation as well as
judgment aggregation in the present, logic-based sense. For a statement of the results
within an abstract aggregation framework, see Nehring and Puppe (2007), which we also
recommend to readers whenever we refer to Nehring and Puppe (2002). The relationship
between the various frameworks is also discussed in List and Puppe (2009).
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but need not be monotonic, is signicant from both substantive and techni-
cal perspectives. Substantively, monotonicity is neither part of the standard
‘package’ of Arrovian conditions, nor is it included in the early impossibil-
ity theorems on judgment aggregation. And technically, a key tool for the
generation of characterization results, namely Nehring and Puppe’s so-called
‘intersection property’ (2002), is not available without requiring monotonic-
ity, and thus the proof of characterization results without this requirement
presents an important technical challenge. Turning to another issue, distinct
from monotonicity, a further condition called implication preservation, which
is inspired by recent work on probabilistic opinion pooling and strengthens
unanimity preservation, has not yet been investigated at all in the context of
judgment aggregation.
Conditions on an
aggregation rule
(in addition to regularity, unan im ity
preservation & prop ’w ise aggregation)
Monotonicity
not required
Monotonicity
required
Non-dictatorship
Totally blocked
& even-number negatable
(Dokow&Holzman forthcom ing,
su ciency also in D ietrich&List 2007a)
Totally blocked
(Nehring&Puppe 2002)
Non-dictatorship
& neutrality between
prop’s and negations
Non-simple
& even-number negatable
& non-separable
(D ietrich&List 2007a)
Non-simple
& non-separable
(Nehring&Puppe 2005)
Non-dictatorship
& neutrality
Non-simple
& even-number negatable
(D ietrich&List 2005)
Non-simple
(Nehring&Puppe 2002)
Non-oligarchy ?
Semi-blocked
& non trivial
(Nehring 2006)
Anonymity ?
Blocked
(Nehring&Puppe 2005)
No veto power ?
Minimally
blocked
(Nehring&Puppe 2002)
Implication preservation ? ?
Table 2: Classes of agendas (decision problems) generating an impossibility
4
Table 2 summarizes what is and is not known on propositionwise aggre-
gation. (The table leaves out some early notable non-characterization results,
including List and Pettit 2002, Pauly and van Hees 2006, Dietrich 2006a and
Mongin 2008, as well as some results on truth-functional agendas, e.g., Nehring
and Puppe 2008, Dokow and Holzman 2009a.) The headings of the rows and
columns indicate the conditions imposed on the aggregation rule, and the cor-
responding entries indicate the classes of decision problems (agendas) for which
the given conditions are impossible to satisfy. By implication, for all decision
problems (agendas) without the indicated properties, the conditions on the
aggregation rule can be satised. The family of blockedness conditions — prop-
erly dened below — was rst introduced in a related framework by Nehring
and Puppe (2002).
The present paper lls the ve blanks in Table 2, where there are still ques-
tion marks. In each case, we fully characterize the class of decision problems
(agendas) for which the indicated conditions lead to an impossibility, which,
as noted, simultaneously provides a characterization of the class of decision
problems for which they can be met.
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we introduce the formal
model, following List and Pettit (2002) and Dietrich (2007). In Section 3, we
present our results in answer to the question marks in Table 2, devoting one
subsection to each new result. Our last result (on implication preservation)
turns out to cover two question marks at once. In Section 4, nally, we give
an overview of the logical relationships between the various classes of decision
problems, partially ordering them by inclusion, and draw some more general
lessons from our ndings. All proofs are given in the Appendix.
2 Model
We consider a nite set of three or more individuals  = {1  } who are
faced with a decision problem that requires making judgments on some propo-
sitions. The propositions are represented in a language L (with negation oper-
ator ¬), dened as a set of sentences (called propositions) that is closed under
negation, i.e.,   L implies ¬  L. The simplest example of such a language
is given by propositional logic, where L consists of some ‘atomic’ propositions
   and all ‘compound’ propositions constructible from them using the con-
nectives  (‘and’),  (‘or’), (material ‘if-then’) etc. Richer languages, which
are often needed to express realistic decision problems, may also include quan-
tiers (‘for all’ and ‘there exists’) or non-truth-functional connectives (e.g.,
subjunctive ‘if-then’, modal operators etc.).
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The language is endowed with a notion of consistency: every set of propo-
sitions 	  L is either consistent or inconsistent (but not both). This notion
is well-behaved:
• Every proposition-negation pair {¬}  L is inconsistent.
• Subsets of consistent sets 	  L are still consistent.
• The empty set  is consistent, and every consistent set 	  L has a
consistent superset 
  L that contains a member of each proposition-
negation pair {¬}  L.
We say that a set 	  L entails a proposition   L, written  ` , if
 	 {¬} is inconsistent.2
A decision problem is represented by the agenda of propositions under con-
sideration. Formally, an agenda, denoted, is a non-empty set of propositions
of the form
 = {¬ :   +},
where +  L contains no propositions beginning with the negation operator
¬ (i.e., no propositions of the form ¬ for some   L). In the example of
Table 1, the agenda is
 = {¬ ¬  ¬( )}.
We assume that is nite and that every proposition    is contingent : it is
neither a contradiction nor a tautology (i.e., {} and {¬} are each consistent).
To simplify our notation, we assume that double-negations cancel each
other out: for any   , where  belongs to the proposition-negation pair
{¬}  L (with   +), we write ‘¬’ to refer to the other member of that
pair. This ensures that ¬ is still in .
A judgment set is a subset    of the agenda (‘’ for set of ‘accepted’
propositions). It is complete if it contains a member of each proposition-
negation pair ¬  . It is consistent if it is a consistent set in L. We
write U to denote the set of all complete and consistent (‘fully rational’) judg-
ment sets. A prole (of individual judgment sets) is an -tuple (1  ) of
judgment sets across the individuals in  .
An aggregation rule is a function  that assigns to each prole of individual
judgment sets (1  ) from some non-empty domain of admissible proles
a resulting collective judgment set  =  (1  )  , interpreted as the
judgment set held by the group  as a whole. We restrict our attention to
2Our formal framework allows one to interpret inconsistency either semantically (as non-
satisability) or syntactically (as derivability of a contradiction). Accordingly, the derivative
notion of entailment has either a semantic or a syntactic interpretation. In the former case
the symbol ‘²’ is more common than our symbol ‘`’.
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regular aggregation rules, dened as functions  : U  U, which accept as
admissible input all proles of complete and consistent individual judgment
sets (universal domain) and generate as output a complete and consistent
collective judgment set (collective rationality).
3 Results
As a background to our results, we rst recapitulate the analogue of Ar-
row’s theorem in judgment aggregation. While the conditions of universal
domain and collective rationality satised by a regular judgment aggregation
rule are the analogues of Arrow’s equally named conditions, Arrow’s condi-
tions of independence of irrelevant alternatives, the weak Pareto principle and
non-dictatorship have the following three analogues:
Propositionwise independence. For all    and all admissible proles
(1  ) (
0
1  
0
), if    
   0 for all individuals , then  
 (1  )
    (01  0).
Unanimity preservation. For all admissible unanimous proles (  ),
we have  (  ) = .
Non-dictatorship. There exists no individual    (a dictator) such that
 (1  ) =  for every admissible prole (1  ).
Aggregation rules satisfying these conditions are respectively called propo-
sitionwise, unanimity-preserving and non-dictatorial. The regular aggregation
rules with these properties are precisely the judgment-aggregation analogues
of preference aggregation rules satisfying Arrow’s classic conditions. For which
decision problems can we nd such rules?
While Arrow’s theorem tells us that in the case of preference aggregation
there are such rules if and only if there are at most two alternatives (while
there are none if and only if there are three or more alternatives), the necessary
and sucient conditions for the existence (or non-existence) of such rules in
the case of judgment aggregation are more complicated. To introduce these
conditions, we must begin with some preliminary terminology. We say that
a proposition    conditionally entails another proposition   , written
 ` , if {} 	  `  for some set    consistent with  and with ¬.
Further, for     we write  ``  if there exists a sequence of propositions
1     such that  = 1 ` 2 `  `  = . (So `` is the transitive
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closure of `.) Finally, a set   L is minimal inconsistent if it is inconsistent
but all its subsets are consistent. Now an agenda  is called
• totally blocked if, for all propositions    , we have  ``  (Nehring
and Puppe 2002);
• even-number negatable if there is a minimal inconsistent set    such
that ( \) 	 {¬ :   } is consistent for some subset    of even
size (Dietrich 2007 and Dietrich and List 2007a; an equivalent condition
is Dokow and Holzman’s forthcoming non-aneness condition).
While total blockedness requires that any two propositions can be linked
by a path of conditional entailments, even-number negatability requires that
the agenda includes a minimal inconsistent set that becomes consistent by
negating some even number of its members. We are now in a position to state
the analogue of Arrow’s theorem.
Theorem 1 If the agenda is totally blocked and even-number negatable, there
exists no propositionwise, unanimity-preserving and non-dictatorial aggrega-
tion rule  : U  U. Otherwise there exist such rules.
In this form, Theorem 1 was proved by Dokow and Holzman (forthcoming);
the impossibility part was also proved by Dietrich and List (2007a). The
result builds on an earlier theorem by Nehring and Puppe (2002), in which the
aggregation rule is required to satisfy the additional condition ofmonotonicity,
while the agenda condition of even-number negatability is not needed. Unlike
Arrow’s theorem, which shows that preference aggregation in accordance with
Arrow’s conditions is impossible for all but the most trivial decision problems
(namely for all except binary decisions), its analogue in the case of judgment
aggregation implies a signicant possibility. After all, the conjunction of total
blockedness and even-number negatability is quite demanding and violated by
many decision problems discussed in the literature on judgment aggregation,
including the example of Table 1. However, the condition of non-dictatorship
is arguably too weak to guarantee fully ‘democratic’ judgment aggregation
in the ordinary sense of the term. In what follows, we consider three ways
of strengthening the requirement of non-dictatorship — namely non-oligarchy,
anonymity and no individual veto power — and nally one strengthening of
unanimity preservation — namely implication preservation, thereby addressing
all the question marks in Table 2.
3.1 Non-oligarchic aggregation
To introduce the condition of non-oligarchy, call an aggregation rule  oli-
garchic if there is a non-empty set    (of oligarchs) and a judgment
8
set   U (the default) such that, for all    and all admissible proles
(1  ),
   (1  )

½
   for all oligarchs   if   \
   for some oligarch   if   .
Under this notion of an oligarchy, rst dened by Nehring and Puppe (2008), a
group of oligarchs has the power to determine the overall collective judgment
on any given proposition  whenever they are unanimous on  and to force
the group to revert to a default judgment on  whenever they disagree.3 A
dictatorship is the special case in which the set of oligarchs is singleton. It is
now reasonable to ask for which decision problems we can nd aggregation
rules satisfying the previous conditions with non-dictatorship strengthened as
follows:
Non-oligarchy. The aggregation rule  is not oligarchic.
Call an agenda  semi-blocked if, for all propositions    , we have
[ ``  and  `` ] or [ `` ¬ and ¬ `` ] (Nehring 2006).
Theorem 2 If the agenda is semi-blocked and even-number negatable, there
exists no propositionwise, unanimity-preserving and non-oligarchic aggregation
rule  : U  U. Otherwise there exist such rules.4
Theorem 2 continues to hold if we impose the additional condition of
monotonicity on the aggregation rule while weakening even-number negatabil-
ity to the condition that the agenda is non-trivial, i.e., contains propositions
  such that  is not logically equivalent to  or ¬ (where logical equivalence
means mutual entailment).5 The latter is Nehring’s (2006) characterization
result.
3Another notion of oligarchy, discussed in Gärdenfors (2006), Dietrich and List (2008)
and Dokow and Holzman (2006), denes  (1  ) as , without any default
judgments. An oligarchy in this sense typically generates incomplete collective judgments,
whereas the one discussed in the present paper guarantees completeness.
4As a corollary, all propositionwise and unanimity-preserving aggregation rules  : U 
U are oligarchic but not all are dictatorial if and only if the agenda is semi- but not totally
blocked and even-number negatable. This remains true if ‘even-number negatable’ is re-
placed with ‘non-trivial’ (by Lemma 3) or monotonicity is imposed on  (or both).
5If we exclude agendas containing logically equivalent but distinct propositions, the trivial
agendas are precisely the binary agendas containing only a single proposition-negation pair.
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3.2 Anonymous aggregation
The next condition to be investigated is anonymity, the requirement of equal
treatment of all individuals.
Anonymity. For all admissible proles (1  ) (01  0) which are
permutations of each other,  (1  ) =  (01  
0
).
For which decision problems can we nd anonymous propositionwise ag-
gregation rules? Call an agenda  blocked if it contains a proposition   
such that  `` ¬ and ¬ ``  (Nehring and Puppe 2002).
Theorem 3 Let  be even. If the agenda is blocked, there exists no proposi-
tionwise, unanimity-perserving and anonymous aggregation rule  : U  U;
otherwise there exist such rules.
Interestingly, this result (as well as our subsequent results below) requires
no even-number negation condition on the agenda, despite not requiring
monotonicity. However, it remains valid if we add monotonicity as a con-
dition on  . The result including monotonicity (as well as the monotonic
variant of the corollary below) was proved by Nehring and Puppe (2002). For
an odd group size , the agenda condition for the impossibility is not blocked-
ness but a stronger and very complex condition. We spare the reader with
the details, which are developed in the monotonic case by Nehring and Puppe
(2002). Jointly with Nehring and Puppe’s result for odd , Theorem 3 implies
the following corollary, which again continues to hold if monotonicity is added
as a further condition on  :
Corollary 1 There exist propositionwise, unanimity-perserving and anony-
mous aggregation rules  : U  U for all group sizes  if and only if the
agenda is not blocked.
3.3 Aggregation without veto power
Note that oligarchic aggregation rules have the special property that all oli-
garchs have the power to veto (i.e., prevent) any collective judgment set other
than the default one. Even anonymous aggregation rules do not automati-
cally avoid the presence of such veto power: in fact, they may give veto power
to every individual. Just consider the case of anonymous oligarchic rules, in
which every individual is an oligarch. These observations suggest that it may
be democratically appealing to require the absence of individual veto power.
10
No individual veto power. For all admissible proles (1  ) in which
 1 individual judgment sets coincide, say they are each equal to , we have
 (1  ) = .
Informally, the condition of no individual veto power requires that no sin-
gleton or empty coalition can ever veto any judgment set. This simultaneously
strengthens non-oligarchy (and thereby also non-dictatorship) and unanimity
preservation. For which decision problems can this condition be met? Unfor-
tunately, the answer is that, for small group sizes, it can never be met, while,
for suciently large group sizes, it can be met only for rather special agendas.
Specically, call an agenda  minimally blocked if it contains at least two
non-equivalent propositions     such that  ``  and  `` .6
Theorem 4 If the agenda is minimally blocked, there exists no propositionwise
aggregation rule  : U  U without individual veto power. Otherwise there
exist such rules if   2 ||2 1 (‘large groups’) and no such rules if   ,
where  is the size of the largest minimal inconsistent subset of  (‘small
groups’).
The theorem continues to hold if we impose the additional conditions of
anonymity, monotonicity or unanimity preservation on  (the last condition
already follows from no individual veto power). Are the bounds on the group
size  in Theorem 4 tight or do the stated (im)possibilities hold even un-
der weaker bounds? The upper bound  is tight.7 As for the lower bound
2
||
2
1, any possible replacement (which is a function of ||) would still grow
exponentially in the agenda size ||, as shown in the Appendix, thereby fur-
ther reinforcing the limited possibility of propositionwise judgment aggregation
without individual veto power. The following corollary simplies Theorem 4:
Corollary 2 There exist propositionwise aggregation rules  : U  U with-
out individual veto power for all suciently large group sizes  if and only if
the agenda is not minimally blocked.
Like the theorem, this corollary remains true if anonymity, monotonicity
or unanimity preservation are added as conditions on  . With the last two
additions, the corollary yields Nehring and Puppe’s result (2002).8
6Equivalently, an agenda is minimally blocked if there exists at least one nite sequence
of (not all logically equivalent) propositions 1   with 1 ` 2 `  `  ` 1.
7More precisely, for every   {2 3 }, some agendas  with  =  lead to possibility
for each group size 	 
  .
8Nehring and Puppe state their result as an equivalence between an aggregation possi-
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3.4 Implication-preserving aggregation
The conditions investigated so far — non-oligarchy, anonymity and no indi-
vidual veto power — all strengthen the original condition of non-dictatorship.
We have noted that the condition of no individual veto power strengthens
unanimity preservation as well. We now turn to a condition that strengthens
unanimity preservation alone, against the background of regular proposition-
wise aggregation. The condition is inspired by recent work on probabilistic
opinion pooling (Dietrich and List 2007c).
Implication preservation. For all     and all admissible proles
(1  ), if        for all individuals , then    (1  )
   (1  )
Informally, implication preservation requires that, if in all individuals’ judg-
ments  materially implies , then  also materially implies  in the collective
judgment. If the language L contains the material conditional , this can
also be expressed as the requirement that, if  `    for all individu-
als , then we also have  (1  ) `   . Note that an aggregation
rule  : U  U satisfying implication preservation also satises unanimity
preservation. (By taking  = ¬ in the condition of implication preservation,
we can see that unanimous individual judgments on each proposition must be
preserved collectively.)
It turns out that implication-preserving propositionwise aggregation is pos-
sible only for an extremely restrictive class of decision problems: those in which
the agenda is ‘simple’. Call an agenda  non-simple if it has at least one min-
imal inconsistent subset of size greater than two (in short, if   2).
Theorem 5 If the agenda is non-simple, there exists no propositionwise,
implication-preserving and non-dictatorial aggregation rule  : U  U. Oth-
erwise there exist such rules.
As this result shows, by strengthening unanimity preservation to implica-
tion preservation, we obtain an impossibility result that holds for most agen-
das — indeed, for all the agendas used in discursive dilemma examples in the
literature. Again, the result requires no even-number negation condition on
the agenda, despite not requiring monotonicity, but remains true if we add
bility and the agenda condition of non-minimal-blockedness, but the aggregation possibility
should be read as holding for suciently large 	, since Nehring and Puppe’s proof requires
suciently large 	 (and since small 	 implies impossibility by Theorem 4).
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monotonicity as a condition on the aggregation rule. Thus Theorem 5 ad-
dresses the last two question marks in Table 2 above.
Interestingly, in the case of probabilistic opinion pooling, the directly anal-
ogous conditions on an aggregation rule (propositionwise independence, impli-
cation preservation and regularity) yield a characterization of linear averaging
on the class of non-simple agendas (Dietrich and List 2007c), whereas in the
present case of binary judgment aggregation, only degenerate such rules re-
main, namely dictatorial ones, which give zero weight to all except one indi-
vidual. One might argue, therefore, that the present impossibility stems not
necessarily from an undue strength of implication preservation (which is, after
all, satised by a common class of aggregation rules in the probabilistic case),
but from the informational limitations of binary judgments.9
4 Conclusion
We hope to have settled the most salient open questions concerning proposi-
tionwise aggregation. Our starting point has been the baseline case of proposi-
tionwise judgment aggregation in accordance with Arrow-inspired conditions.
We have characterized the classes of decision problems (agendas) for which
propositionwise judgment aggregation is possible under various strengthenings
of these conditions, requiring, respectively, non-oligarchy, anonymity, no in-
dividual veto power and implication preservation. Table 3 summarizes our
results.
Conditions on an
aggregation rule
(in addition to regu larity, unanim ity
preservation & prop’w ise aggregation)
Monotonicity
not required
Monotonicity
required
Non-oligarchy
Semi-blocked
& even-number negatable
(see above)
Anonymity Blocked
No veto power Minimally blocked
Implication preservation Non-simple
Table 3: Classes of agendas (decision problems) generating an impossibility
(summary of our results)
9In the probabilistic case, implication preservation is equivalent to conditional zero-
preservation, the requirement that, for any    , if all individuals unanimously assign a
conditional probability of 0 to  given , this assignment should be preserved collectively.
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By superimposing Table 3 upon Table 2 above, we are able to ll all the
gaps in the earlier table. Note that in the last three rows our results subsume
the cases with and without requiring monotonicity; here, unlike in previous
results in the literature, monotonicity makes no dierence.
Given the large number of agenda conditions occurring in the literature on
judgment aggregation and the present paper, as summarized in Tables 2 and
3, it is useful to clarify the logical relationships between the various conditions
diagrammatically. Figure 1 partially orders these conditions and the resulting
classes of decision problems by inclusion. The strongest (most restrictive)
condition is at the bottom, the weakest (most permissive) at the top.
Figure 1: Logical relationships between dierent agenda conditions
What general lessons can we learn from the present results? It is clear that,
with increasing strength of the conditions imposed on propositionwise aggre-
gation, we are faced with increasingly general impossibility results, and the
classes of decision problems for which there remain possibilities become more
and more restrictive. Given that genuinely ‘democratic’ judgment aggregation
requires more than non-dictatorship alone, it is fair to conclude that, for many
real-world decision problems, classic, propositionwise aggregation is not demo-
cratically feasible. This leaves us with three main solutions. We can either
try to relax some of the other Arrow-inspired conditions, notably universal
domain and collective rationality, or search for alternatives to propositionwise
aggregation, or move from binary judgments to more general propositional at-
titudes, such as non-binary or probabilistic ones, as already mentioned briey
above.
Relaxations of universal domain have been investigated by List (2003),
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Dietrich and List (2007d) and Pivato (forthcoming), relaxations of collective
rationality by several contributions, including List and Pettit (2002), Diet-
rich and List (2007e, f, 2008), Gärdenfors (2006) and Dokow and Holzman
(2006). The literature also contains some work on aggregation rules that drop
the restriction of propositionwise aggregation. Among the proposals investi-
gated are the ‘premise-based’ aggregation rules (Pettit 2001, List and Pettit
2002, Bovens and Rabinowicz 2006, Dietrich 2006a, Mongin 2008, Dietrich
and Mongin 2007, building also on Kornhauser and Sager 1986), the ‘sequen-
tial priority’ rules (List 2004, Dietrich 2006b) and the ‘distance-based’ rules
(Pigozzi 2006, Miller and Osherson 2009, building also on Konieczny and Pino-
Perez 2002). Finally, extensions of the model of judgment aggregation to more
general propositional attitudes, such as non-binary or probabilistic ones, have
been oered by Dietrich and List (2007c, forthcoming) and Dokow and Holz-
man (2009b), building also on earlier work on abstract aggregation (Rubinstein
and Fishburn 1986) and probability aggregation (e.g., Genest and Zidek 1986).
Arguably, the further exploration of non-propositionwise aggregation and
the systematic study of more general propositional attitudes are the biggest
future challenges in the theory of judgment aggregation. We hope that, by
settling the most salient open questions on classic propositionwise aggregation,
the present paper inspires the literature to move on to these new challenges.
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A Appendix: proofs
General notation. For all    ( ) we write ¬ := ( \)	{¬ :   }.
Let  be the (equivalence) relation on  dened by    
 [ ``  and
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 `` ]. Whenever we consider an aggregation rule  , we denote by C
or simply C the set of coalitions    that are winning for  ( ),
i.e., for which    (1  ) for all admissible proles (1  ) with
{ :   } = . (If  is propositionwise, it is uniquely determined by its
family of winning coalitions (C) ; if  is also unanimity-preserving resp.
monotonic, each set C contains  resp. is closed under enlarging coalitions.)
A.1 Proof of Theorem 2 on non-oligarchic aggregation
To proof begins with three lemmas (the rst of which is known10).
Lemma 1 If the aggregation rule  : U  U is propositionwise and
unanimity-preserving, then  `   C  C	 for all    .
Proof. Although known, we recall the simple argument. For  as specied,
consider     with  ` . Let   C. By  `  there is    such
that  	 {¬} is inconsistent but  	{} and  	 {¬} are consistent.
It follows that  	 { } and  	 {¬¬} are consistent. So, there is an
(1  )  U such that each ,   , includes  	 { } and each ,
 6 , includes  	{¬¬}. Now  (1  ) contains  (by   C) and all
   (by  C
), hence it contains  (by {}	 `  and  (1  )  U).
So,   C	 as  is propositionwise. ¥
Lemma 2 Every even-number negatable agenda is non-trivial.
Proof. Let  be even-number negatable. Then there exists a minimal
inconsistent    such that ¬ is consistent for an even-sized    .
So there are distinct    . Now  is non-trivial because  is not logi-
cally equivalent to  (otherwise  would remain inconsistent after removing )
and not logically equivalent to ¬ (otherwise {¬¬} would be inconsistent,
violating the consistency of ¬). ¥
Lemma 3 Every non-trivial agenda that is semi- but not totally blocked is
even-number negatable.
Proof. Let  be non-trivial, semi-blocked and not totally blocked. As
 is an equivalence relation,  is partitioned into equivalence classes. By
assumption on ,
10See Dietrich and List (2007a) and Dokow and Holzman (forthcoming), and earlier
Nehring and Puppe (2002), who also assume monotonicity.
18
(i) there are exactly two -equivalence classes, each containing exactly one
member of each pair ¬  .
Moreover,
(ii) there is a minimal inconsistent    such that | |  3,
since otherwise every conditional entailment in is in fact an unconditional
entailment, so that each -equivalence class consists of logically equivalent
propositions, which by (i) implies that  is trivial, a contradiction. Further,
one of the two -equivalence classes in (i) satises  6`  for all  in this class
and all  in the other class, since otherwise    for  and  from dierent
classes; hence,
(iii) some-equivalence class shares at most one element with each minimal
inconsistent set   .
The simple properties (i)-(iii) allow us to prove a key fact:
(iv) for every minimal inconsistent set   , ¬ is consistent for each
non-empty subset    of pairwise -equivalent propositions.
To show this, let  and and  be as in (iv). If  is singleton, ¬ is
obviously consistent (by  ’s minimal inconsistency). Now let ||  2. Suppose
for a contradiction that ¬ is inconsistent. Let  0 be a minimal inconsistent
subset of ¬ . Let  be the -equivalence class with    , and  the
other -equivalence class. By |   |  2 and (iii), | 0   |  1. So
| 0  {¬ :   }|  1 (as {¬ :   }  by (i)). So  0  ( \) 	 {¬}
for some   . But ( \)	{¬} is consistent (by  ’s minimal inconsistency).
So  0 is consistent, a contradiction.
To complete the proof, let  be as in (ii). By | |  3 and (i),  contains
two distinct -equivalent  . So, by (iv), even-number negatability holds
with this  and with  := { }. ¥
Proof of Theorem 2. We prove each direction of the implication.
1. First, suppose the agenda is semi-blocked and even-number negatable.
Let  : U  U be propositionwise and unanimity-preserving. We show that
 is oligarchic.
Case 1:  is totally blocked. Then  is dictatorial (hence oligarchic) by
Theorem 1.
Case 2:  is not totally blocked. So, as  is also non-trivial by Lemma 2,
the assumptions of Lemma 3 are satised. Hence  has the properties (i)-(iv)
shown in the proof of Lemma 3; we shall use some of these properties. Let
   be the -equivalence class in (iii), and  := \ the only other
-equivalence class (by (i)). Now
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(v) there is a minimal inconsistent set    with | |  3 such that
|  | = 1.
Suppose the contrary. Then    6=  only for minimal inconsistent
sets    of size 2. So every conditional entailment  `  with   
satises  `  and    (the latter since otherwise ¬   , implying
|  {¬}| = 2). Hence the members of  are connected by paths of
unconditional entailments, so are pairwise logically equivalent. So  = \
(= {¬ :   }) also consists of pairwise logically equivalent propositions.
Hence  is trivial, a contradiction by Lemma 2.
Let  be as in (v). Let  be the element in   , and  0 two distinct
elements in    . By Lemma 1, the set of coalitions C is the same for all
   ; call it C. We now prove a rst closure-property of C:
(vi)  0  C     0  C (intersection-closedness).
Let  0  C. Each of the sets ¬{}, ¬{0}, ¬{} and ¬{0} is consistent
(the rst three by  ’s minimal inconsistency, the fourth by (iv)). So, there is
a prole (1  )  U such that
• ¬{}   for all      0,
• ¬{0}   for all   \ 0,
• ¬{}   for all    0\,
• ¬{0}   for all   \( 	  0).
Now  (1  ) contains  since   C and    , contains 0 since  0 
C and 0   , and contains all    \{ 0 } by unanimity preservation. In
summary,  \{}   (1  ). So, as  \{} ` ¬,  (1  ) contains
¬. Hence   0  C¬, i.e.,   0  C (as ¬   by   ), as required.
Next, we prove a second closure property of C:
(vii)   C&   0     0  C (superset-closedness).
Assume   C&   0   . We distinguish two cases.
• First, suppose ¬{} is consistent. Then there exists a prole
(1  )  U in which
— all    accept all propositions in ¬{},
— all    0\ accept all propositions in ¬{},
— all   \ 0 accept all propositions in ¬{}.
 (1  ) contains  by   C and    , and contains all  
 \{} by unanimity preservation. In summary,
 \{}   (1  ). So, by  \{} ` ¬, ¬   (1  ).
Hence  0  C¬, i.e.,  0  C (by ¬   ), as required.
• Second, suppose ¬{} is inconsistent. We consider a prole
(1  )  U in which
— all    accept all propositions in ¬{},
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— all    0\ accept all propositions in ¬( \{}) (which is consis-
tent by (iv)),
— all   \ accept all propositions in ¬( \{}) (which is consistent,
again by (iv)).
 (1  ) contains ¬ by   C and ¬   , and contains all
   \{ }, again by   C. In summary, ¬{}\{}   (1  ).
So, as ¬{}\{} `  (by the case-B assumption),    (1  ).
Hence,  0  C, i.e.,  0  C (by    ), as required.
By (vi) and (vii), C = {   :  } for = C, where 6=  by
unanimity preservation. So  is oligarchic with default and set of oligarchs
 , which completes the impossibility proof.
2. Conversely, suppose the agenda  is not semi-blocked or not even-
number negatable.
Case 1:  is non-trivial. If  is not semi-blocked, then by Nehring (2006)
there exists a non-oligarchic aggregation rule satisfying all properties (and
even monotonicity). If  is semi-blocked, then by assumption it is not even-
number negatable (hence totally blocked by Lemma 3). So, the parity rule
 : U  P() among any odd-sized subgroup    with | |  3,
dened by  (1  ) = {   : |{   :   }| is odd}, has all
properties: it is obviously propositionwise, non-oligarchic and (by oddness of
| |) unanimity-preserving, and it generates values in U, as rst shown by
Dokow and Holzman (forthcoming).11
Case 2:  is trivial. Dene  : U  P() as majority voting among
a xed subgroup    of odd size with | |  3.  is obviously non-
oligarchic, propositionwise and unanimity-preserving. Finally, as all minimal
inconsistent sets    have size 2 by triviality,  generates sets in U,
as the following classic argument shows. For any (1  )  U, the set
 :=  (1  ) contains a member of each pair ¬   (as  is odd).
If  were inconsistent, it would have a minimal inconsistent subset   .
We have | | = 2. So, as each    is majority-accepted within  and as
two majorities within  must overlap, some individual    has    ,
contradicting ’s consistency. ¥
A.2 Proof of Theorem 3 on anonymous aggregation
Proof. Let  be even.
11More precisely, Dokow and Holzman show this not for even-number negatability but for
an equivalent (‘non-aneness’) condition. For the proof with even-number negatability, see
Dietrich (2007).
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First, suppose the agenda is blocked. For a contradiction, let  be an
aggregation rule with the required properties. By blockedness, there is a   
such that  `` ¬ and ¬ `` . By Lemma 1, C = C¬; call this set
C. As  is even, there is a    with || = |\|. Consider a prole
(1  )  U in which  is accepted by all    and ¬ by all   \.
Since by anonymity   C 
 \  C, either both or none of ¬ are in
 (1  ), a contradiction as  (1  )  U.
Conversely, if the agenda is not blocked, there exists an aggregation rule
with the stated properties (and even with monotonicity), as shown by Nehring
and Puppe (2002) who construct a particular (asymmetric) unanimity rule, i.e.,
an oligarchy with maximal set of oligarchs  . (The main part of their proof is
to establish that there exists a judgment set   U with at most one element
in common with any minimal inconsistent set   ; this set  serves as the
default of the oligarchy.) ¥
A.3 Proof of Theorem 4 on aggregation without indi-
vidual veto power and of the tightness claims about
inequalities
Proof of Theorem 4. Parts of the argument are adapted from Nehring and
Puppe’s (2002) proof of their veto power result.12
1. First, suppose  is minimally blocked. For a contradiction, suppose
 : U  U is propositionwise and without individual veto power. By min-
imal blockedness, there are propositions 1  , not all pairwise logically
equivalent, such that 1 ` 2 `  `  ` 1. Among these conditional
entailments there is one, say  ` , that is not an unconditional entailment,
i.e., such that  6`  (otherwise 1   would be pairwise logically equivalent).
By  `  there is a    such that  	 {¬} is inconsistent but  	 {}
and  	{¬} are consistent. Hence each of  	{ } and  	{¬¬} is also
consistent. By 1 ` 2 `  `  ` 1 and Lemma 1, C = C. This set
of winning coalitions — call it C — need not be closed under taking supersets
(as  need not be monotonic), but it certainly contains all coalitions of size at
least   1 as  is without veto power. In particular, C is non-empty, hence
contains a minimal member  (with respect to set inclusion). By \ 6 C¬
and   C¬ we have  6= . So there is an   . Consider a prole
(1  )  U in which
• individual  accepts all propositions in {¬} (a consistent set by  6` ),
12In particular, the aggregation rule constructed in case B of part 3 is a complicated
variant of Nehring and Puppe’s aggregation rule (which we could not have used here).
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• all individuals in \{} accept all propositions in { } 	  ,
• all individuals in \ accept all propositions in {¬¬} 	  .
Now  (1  ) contains  (as   C), each    (as coalitions of size
at least  1 are in C), but not  (as \{} 6 C by ’s minimality). Hence,
{¬} 	    (1  ), a contradiction as {¬} 	  is inconsistent.
2. Next, suppose    . We show that there is no propositionwise
 : U  U without individual veto power. For a contradiction, let  be such
an aggregation rule. Consider a minimal inconsistent set    of maximal
size. Then | |  , and so  has  pairwise distinct elements 1  . By  ’s
minimal inconsistency, each set ¬{} is consistent, and hence there is a prole
(1  )  U such that ¬{}   for each    . Now  (1  )
contains each    , since at least 1 individuals accept  and  is without
individual veto power. So  (1  ) is inconsistent, a contradiction.
3. Now suppose  is not minimally blocked and   21, where  :=
|| 2. We construct an aggregation rule with the required properties. We
may assume without loss of generality that  does not contain distinct but
logically equivalent propositions.13 As  is not minimally blocked and no two
propositions are logically equivalent, `` is an anti-symmetric relation on .
As `` is also transitive, it is a partial order, hence can be extended to a linear
order  on  that satises
(*)    
 ¬  ¬ for all    ,
by a standard type of argument (e.g., Duggan 1999): the set of partial
orders extending `` and satisfying (*) is non-empty (it contains ``) and
closed under taking the union of any chain, hence by Zorn’s Lemma contains
a maximal element , which can be shown to be complete, hence is a linear
order. We partition  into the sets  and  containing the  lowest
resp.  highest elements of , and denote the members of  by 1  
in increasing order. We have
(**) 1 !  !  ! ¬ !  ! ¬1 (hence  = {¬ :   }),
as can easily be derived from (*).
We distinguish two cases, A and B.
13To see why, suppose the existence proof is done for such agendas , and now let 
be arbitrary. Call two proposition-negation pairs {¬} {¬}   equivalent if  is
equivalent to  (hence ¬ to ¬) or  is equivalent to ¬ (hence ¬ to ). This denes
an equivalence relation. Consider a (sub)agenda ˜   that includes exactly one pair
{¬} from each equivalence class. Clearly, ˜ contains no distinct but logically equivalent
propositions, so that there exists an aggregation rule ˜ : U˜  U˜ for ˜ of the required
form. ˜ induces an aggregation rule  : U  U for  by identifying each ˜  U˜ with the
unique   U satisfying   ˜. As the reader can check,  inherits from  the required
properties, namely propositionwise independence and no individual veto power.
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Case A:  is minimal inconsistent. We begin by proving a claim.
Claim A1.  is the only minimal inconsistent subset of  other than the
trivial ones {¬}  .
Let  be a non-trivial minimal inconsistent subset. First, we have
| |  1, because if    had distinct members, say ¬¬, then
¬ !  (by ¬ ` ) but  ! ¬ (as    and ¬  ), a contradic-
tion. In fact,   = , by the following argument. Suppose the contrary.
Then   is a singleton, say {¬}. The minimal inconsistent set  does
not equal {¬} (by non-triviality of  ), hence does not contain , hence is
a subset of (\{})	{¬}, a contradiction since the latter set is consistent
(by ’s minimal inconsistency). By    =  we have   , hence
 =  as  is (like  ) minimal inconsistent. This completes the proof of
Claim A1.
Dene a family of thresholds (") by
" =
½
 1 if   
2 if   
and consider the aggregation rule  : U  P() (a quota rule) given by
 (1  ) := {   : |{ :   }|  "}.
As  is obviously propositionwise and without individual veto power, it re-
mains to prove the following claim.
Claim A2.  generates complete and consistent judgment sets.
Completeness holds because " +"¬  + 1 for all    (in fact, with
equality). Consistency is equivalent to the system of inequalities
X


"
  (| |  1) for every minimal inconsistent set   , (1)
by (the anonymous case of) Nehring and Puppe’s (2002) ‘intersection prop-
erty’ result.14 By Claim A1, the system (1) reduces to the single inequalityP
( 1)  (  1), hence to ( 1)  (  1), i.e., to   . If
  2 the latter holds because   3. If   3 it holds by   21  .
This completes the proof of Claim A2.
Case B:  is not minimal inconsistent. Redene the family of thresholds
14We use this result in the variant presented in Dietrich and List (2007e), valid for thresh-
olds in the grid {1  	}.
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(") as
" =
½
 1 for  = 1
 22 for all   {2 },
"¬ = + 1" for all   {1 },
which generates a quota rule  : U  P() dened by
 (1  ) = {   : |{ :   }|  "}.
As  is obviously propositionwise, the proof is completed by proving the fol-
lowing two claims.
Claim B1.  is without individual veto power.
It obviously suces to show that "  1 for all   . There are three
kinds of propositions to consider:
• For each   {1 }, obviously "   1.
• For each   {1 2}, "¬ = + 1" = 2, which is at most  1 by
  3.
• For each   {3 }, "¬ = +1" = 22+1, which is at most
  1 because, by   21  21  4, we have   1   2 + 1 
22 + 1  22 + 1.
This completes the proof of Claim B1.
Claim B2.  generates complete and consistent judgment sets.
As in the proof of Claim A2, completeness is equivalent to the system of
inequalities " +"¬  + 1,   , which is satised (with equality), and
consistency is equivalent to the system (1) (using the fact that by Claim B1
the thresholds (") belong to {1  }, in fact to {2   1}). Consider
any minimal inconsistent set   . There are four cases.
• Let    = {1  } with 1 6  . ThenX


"
 = | | 
X

22,
in which X

22 
X
=2
22 = 21  1 ! 21  .
So,
P

 "
  (| |  1).
• Let    = {1  } with 1   . ThenX


"
 = "1 +
X
 \{1}
" = ( 1) + (| |  1)
X
 \{1}
22.
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As  6=  (by case-B assumption), we have  ( , hence  \{1} (
{2  }. So, as 22 is increasing in ,
X
 \{1}
22 
X
{3}
22 =
X
=3
22 = 21  2 !  1.
Hence, again
P

 "
  (| |  1).
• Let   6=  with 1 6  . We have | |  1 by the argument
in the proof of Claim A1. Let ¬ be the unique member of  . We
also have   6= , since otherwise  = {¬}, which is impossible as
 is inconsistent and we have excluded contradictions from the agenda.
Further,  \{¬}  {2  1} (as for each    \{¬} we have
 ` , hence  ! , and so  ! #). This implies that # 6= 1 (as
 \{¬} 6= ), so that " =  22, and hence "¬ = + 1" =
22 + 1. We haveX


"
 = "¬+
X
 \{¬}
" = (2
2+1)+(| |1)
X
 \{¬}
22,
in which, by  \{¬}  {2  1},
X
 \{¬}
22 
1X
=2
22 = 22  1 ! 22 + 1.
So, again
P

 "
  (| |  1).
• Let   6=  with 1   . By arguments like in the previous case, one
can show that   has a unique member, say ¬, that  \{¬} 
{1  1}, and that "¬ = 22 + 1. So,X


"
 = "¬ +"1 +
X
 \{1¬}
"
= (22 + 1) + ( 1) + (| |  2)
X
 \{1¬}
22
= 22 + (| |  1)
X
 \{1¬}
22,
in which, by  \{1¬}  {2  1},
X
 \{1¬}
22 
1X
=2
22 = 22  1 ! 22.
So, again
P

 "
  (| |  1). This completes the proof of Claim B2.
¥
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Proof that the bound  in Theorem 4 is tight. Consider any  {2 3 }.
We have to specify an agenda  with  =  such that for all    there
is ‘possibility’. Let  be an agenda  = {1¬1   ¬} (containing
 pairs) whose only minimal inconsistent set (apart from the trivial ones
{¬}  ) is  = {1  }. (Such agendas exist of course, except in
very ‘poor’ logics.) Obviously,  = | | = . Fix a group size   . Dene
thresholds "   , as  1 for    and as 2 for   \ . The ‘quota
rule’  : U  P() given by
 (1  ) = {   : |{ :   }|  "}
is trivially propositionwise and without individual veto power, and it generates
outputs in U by an argument analogous to that which shows Claim A2 in the
proof of Theorem 4. ¥
Proof that the bound 2
||
2
1 in Theorem 4 cannot be tightened to a bound
without exponential growth. We show that every sequence ()=12 in (0)
for which Theorem 4 holds with ‘2||21’ replaced by ‘||2’ grows exponen-
tially (i.e., there is an   1 such that    for all suciently large). Let
()=12 be such a sequence; we establish exponential growth by showing
that   " for all , where (")=12 denotes the Fibonacci sequence,
which is dened recursively by "1 = "2 = 1 and " = "1 + "2 for
all   3 and grows exponentially (with " "1 converging to the golden
mean).
Consider a xed   {1 2 }. To (ultimately) show that   " ,
we consider an agenda  = {1¬1  ¬} whose minimal inconsistent
subsets (except the trivial ones of type {¬}) are precisely the sets  :=
{ +1¬} with  #  {1 } and +1 ! #. Such an agenda does indeed
exist, except in ‘poor’ languages, as we should quickly convince ourselves of.
For instance, suppose L is the language of classical propositional logic with (at
least) the connectives ¬ and (at least) the atomic propositions 1   ,
and let L be endowed with the following consistency notion (which enforces
inconsistency of each set ): a set   L is consistent if and only if  	
{¬ :  #  {1 } and  + 1 ! #} is classically consistent; in other
words, our consistency notion is classical consistency conditional on negating
at least one member from each set . The sets  are precisely the non-
trivial minimal inconsistent subsets of . To see why, note rst that each
set  is obviously non-trivial and minimal inconsistent. Conversely, suppose
   is non-trivial and minimal inconsistent. Then for some  we have
 +1   : otherwise  would be consistent, as we could extend  to a
(consistent and complete) set   U by adding each ¬ for which  contains
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none of ¬. Let  be smallest such that  +1   . There exists an
#   + 1 such that ¬   : otherwise  could be extended to a consistent
and complete set   U by adding
• each ¬ for which  contains none of ¬ and $ ! ,
• each  for which  contains none of ¬ and $  .
Note that   , so that  =  by minimal inconsistency.
The proof that   " is completed by establishing the following two
claims.
Claim 1.  is not minimally blocked.
Let  be the linear order on  dened by 1 ! 2 !  !  ! ¬ !
 ! ¬1. Check that, for any distinct    , if  `  then  ! . So, as
there is no !-cycle, there is no `-cycle, as required.
Claim 2. If   " then for some group size    (namely for  = ")
there is no propositionwise aggregation rule  : U  U without individual
veto power.
Let  = " , and assume for a contradiction that  : U  U is a
propositionwise aggregation rule without individual veto power (it need not be
monotonic or anonymous). For each integer %, let C be the set of coalitions
   of size at least %. We prove by induction that C  C for all
 = 1 .
First, C1 = C1  C1 and C2 = C1  C2, as  is without veto
power.
Now let   {3 }, and suppose C0  C0 whenever 0 ! .
Suppose for a contradiction that C 6 C . Then there is a   C
such that  6 C . So, \  C¬ , and by |\|  " = "1 + "2
we can partition \ into coalitions 1 2 of sizes |1|  "1 and |2| 
"2. Hence, \1  C1 and \2  C2 . So, by induction
hypothesis, \1  C1 and \2  C2 . As 1 2 form a partition of
 and as {2 1¬} = +2 is minimal inconsistent, there is a prole
(1  )  U in which
• all    have   {2 1 }
• all   1 have   {2¬1¬}
• all   2 have   {¬2 1¬}.
Then  (1  ) contains 2 by \2  C2 , 1 by \1  C1
and ¬ by \  C¬ , a contradiction as  (1  ) is consistent.
As  = ", we have in particular C0  C . By C0 = P() it follows that
C = P(), whence C¬ = , a contradiction as  is without veto power. ¥
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Inspection of the last proof shows that a tight lower bound on  for Theorem
4 would have to be intermediate in strength between the current bound ‘ 
2
||
2
1’ and the weakest candidate ‘  "||2’ (where" is theth Fibonacci
number). Where in this range the tight bound lies is left as an open question.
A.4 Proof of Theorem 5
To prove the result, we dene a binary relation  on .
Denition 1 For any    , write    if there exists a nite sequence
1     with 1 =  and  =  such that any neighbours  +1 are nei-
ther exclusive nor exhaustive (i.e., { +1} and {¬¬+1} are consistent).
The following lemma summarizes the main properties of . Call an agenda
 nested if it can be written as  = {1¬1   ¬} such that  ` +1
for all   {1   1}. Nestedness implies simplicity: as any two members
of a nested agenda  are (directly) logically dependent, there exist plenty of
minimal inconsistent sets    but all of them have only size 2.
Lemma 4  denes an equivalence relation on , with
• a single equivalence class if  is non-nested,
• exactly two equivalence classes, each of which contains one member of
each pair ¬  , if  is nested.
Proof. These properties are shown in Dietrich and List (2007c), albeit in a
semantic framework with propositions represented as sets of possible worlds;
we leave the simple translation to the reader. ¥
An aggregation rule  is called systematic on  ( ) if, for all  0  
and all admissible proles (1  ) (01  
0
), [   
 0  0 for all
individuals ] implies    (1  ) 
 0   (01  0). For ‘systematic
on ’ we simply say ‘systematic’.
Lemma 5 A propositionwise and implication-preserving aggregation rule  :
U  U is systematic on each -equivalence class.
Proof. Let  be as specied. As  is propositionwise, it suces to show
that C = C	 for all     such that   . In fact, by a straightforward
inductive argument it suces to show that C = C	 for all     for which
{ } and {¬¬} are each consistent.
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Consider any such     and any    ; we show that   C 

  C	. As { } and {¬¬} are consistent, there exist judgment sets
1    U such that
    for all    and ¬¬   for all    .
We have    
    for all , so that by applying implication preservation
in both directions we obtain
   (1  )
    (1  )
Now   C is equivalent to    (1  ), hence (as just shown) to
   (1  ), and so to   C	. ¥
Lemmas 4 and 5 imply the following global systematicity result.
Lemma 6 If the agenda is non-nested, every propositionwise and implication-
preserving aggregation rule  : U  U is systematic.
While the last systematicity result assumed just a non-nested agenda, the
following monotonicity result makes the stronger non-simplicity assumption.
Lemma 7 For a non-simple agenda, every propositionwise and implication-
preserving aggregation rule  : U  U is monotonic.
Proof. Let  and  be as specied. By Lemma 6,  is systematic. So C
is the same for all   ; call this set C. Let    0   with   C; we have
to show that  0  C. As  is non-simple, there exists a minimal inconsistent
set    with | |  3. Choose pairwise distinct      . As each of
¬{}, ¬{	}, ¬{} is consistent, there are 1    U such that
• for all   , ¬{	}  ,
• for all    0\, ¬{}  ,
• for all   \ 0, ¬{}  .
As ¬       for all , we have ¬   (1  )   
 (1  ) by implication preservation. So, as ¬   (1  ) by   C,
we have    (1  ), and hence  0  C (as  is propositionwise). ¥
Proof of Theorem 5. First, let  be non-simple. For a contradiction sup-
pose  is an an aggregation rule with all required properties. By ’s non-
nestedness and the last two lemmas,  is systematic and monotonic. Hence 
is dictatorial by a standard result for non-simple agendas (Nehring and Puppe
2002), a contradiction.
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Conversely, let  be simple. As   3, there exists an odd-sized non-
singleton subgroup    . The aggregation rule  : U  P() dened
as majority voting among the members of  is implication-preserving (as one
can verify), non-dictatorial (by | |  1) and of course propositionwise, and it
generates judgment sets inU (as | | is odd and  is simple; see the argument
in case 2 of part 2 of the proof of Theorem 2). ¥
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